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ABSTRACT
In Chile, all covered workers must place 10% of monthly earnings in a savings account
with a highly regulated intermediary that manages a single fund and provides survivors and
disability insurance. Workers pay a commission charge, in addition to the mandatory 10%, to
finance this insurance and to cover the costs and profits of the intermediaries. On becoming
eligible to receive benefits, a worker can choose between a sequence of phased withdrawals and
a real annuity. In addition, there is a sizable guaranteed minimum pension. Unlike the purchased
annuities, the minimum pension is not indexed, but adjusted by the government from time to
time.
The Chilean reform gets high marks for defending the system from political risk and for
its effects on capital accumulation and on the functioning of the capital market. The Chilean
reform gets low marks for the provision of insurance and for administrative cost.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Chilean reform is the high cost of running a
privatized social security system, higher than the "inefficient" system that it replaced. Valdes-
Prieto has estimated that the average administrative chargeper effective affiliate while active is
U.S. $89.10 per year (for 1991) which is 2.94% of average taxable earnings. This is close to
30% of the 10% mandatory savings rate. The cost perperson is not far from costs observed in
other privately-managed pension systems, such as defined-benefit private pensions in the U.S.
However, it compares unfavorably with administrative costs in well-run unifiedgovernment
managed systems. The issue here is the administrative efficiency of reliance on the private
market, not anything particularly costly about the Chilean system.
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The role of government in the provision of retirement income
is important for the well-being of its people.' It is alsoa classic
example of a problem in institution design that must try to solve
both a complex economic problem and a difficultproblem of
political economy.2 That is, the optimal provision of retirement
income would be a hard problem for a philosopherking, a problem
that would require repeated changes in benefit formulas andtax
rules as economic and demographic uncertaintieswere resolved. It
is precisely this need for additional legislation foroptimal design
that makes the actual behavior ofgovernments such a critical part of
this institutional design. That is,governments will not reproduce
the evolution of social security that a philosopherking would
design. Thus, the optimal design must take into account what
For discussions of the bases for government actionon retirement
income, see Diamond, 1977, and Valdes-Prieto, 1993a.
2 Tokeep the content of this lecture manageable, I will focus on the
provision of retirement income, mostly ignoring both disability insurance
and survivors' insurance.
—1—governments are likely to actually do.3 Since political decision
processes differ considerably across countries, optimal design is
likely to be different in different countries.
In this lecture, I will begin with a brief overview of the
privatization of social security in Chile. I will then consider several
aspects of the Chilean reform including its impact on the provision
of insurance and on the patterns of redistribution, its impact on
capital accumulation and on the workings of the capital market, its
effect on the insulation of retirement income from political risk, and
on the cost of running the retirement income system. In my
discussion, I will contrast what has been done in Chile with
alternatives that are similar in spirit, but somewhat different in
details.I will also contrast the Chilean system, which is
fundamentally designed around a contribution rate with the
alternative of an overall design basically built around a benefit
formula, as is the case with traditional social security systems.
The central concept in a traditional social security system is
a benefit formula. In contrast, the central concept in the Chilean
system is a contribution rate. This contrast is similar to the contrast
between defined benefit and defined contribution private pensions.
The conceptual starting place of a social security system has
powerful effects in shaping the details that follow. I think that the
distinction between contribution and benefit base is more
And, since we are considering what governments do now,
recognizing what governments might do later, there is a further
complication for the policy analyst in the relationship between what
analysts recommend and what governments do.
-2-illuminating than the distinction between privatized and government-
run systems, for various pieces of either type of system can be
privatized.
To jump to my conclusions, the Chilean approach gets high
marks for defending the system from political risk. The Chilean
approach gets low marks for the provision of insurance and for
administrative cost. As implemented in Chile, the approach gets
high marks for its effects on capital accumulation and on the
functioning of the capital market.
This lecture draws very heavily (even to the extent of some
verbatim repetition) on the paper on the Chilean reform that I have
written with Salvador Valdes-Prieto (forthcoming), one that will
appear in a Brookings conference volume on various aspects of
Chilean economic experience. His coauthorship was essential in the
development of that analysis. Naturally, he does not necessarily
agree with everything I say today.
1. Overview of Chilean Reform
Chile began its social insurance system in 1924. By the
1970's it had developed a pattern that is not uncommon. There
were separate defined benefit systems for different industries and
occupations. These were not unified so that benefit structures and
benefit levels were different in different sectors. Having multiple
bureaucracies was inefficient. The benefit formulas were not well
designed for economic incentives. The political determination of
-3-benefit levels had resulted in very high contribution rates, which
(including health) were in the range 51-59% in 1975. Government
financial support to health, pensions, and contributions for
government employees cost 20.5% of total government expenditure.
A major problem was the tendency of the political process to raise
benefits when short-run financing was available because of
immaturity of a particular benefit system. The complementary
problem of the vulnerability of benefit levels to short-run or long-
run fiscal difficulties would probably also be serious in the future.
That is, pensions were excessively dependent on the state of public
finance relative to a reasonable standard. In light of these problems,
planning on social security reform was begun in the 1970's under
the Pinochet government; and, after a significant fiscal surplus had
been built, implementation began in 1981.
The heart of the reform is a privatized mandatory savings
plan, together with a market for indexed annuities for conversion of
accumulations into retirement income streams. It is important to
recognize that a mandatory savings system needs a mechanism for
converting accumulations into retirement income flows. All covered
or "dependent' workers must place 10% of monthly earnings in a
savings account with an approved, highly regulated intermediary, an
Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones, referred to as an AFP.
Each AFP manages a single fund, with the complete return on the
fund allocated to the individual accounts. The AFP also provides
survivors and disability insurance, according to rules set down by
the government. Workers must pay a commission charge to the
-4-AFP, in addition to the mandatory 10%, to finance this disability
and survivors' insurance and to cover the costs and profits of the
AFP's. The commission charges are set by the competing AFP's,
with the government regulating their structure, but not their level.
Workers are free to select any AFP and to switchamong them. On
becoming eligible to receive pension benefits, a worker can choose
between a sequence of phased withdrawals or a real annuity. The
annuity option involves a switch of financial intermediary, as the
annuity must be purchased from an insurance company. The fact
that Chile has a long history of using indexed debt has made iteasy
for the annuity option to be restricted to indexed annuities. It is
worth noting that the private providers of social security are closely
regulated; there has not been reliance on unregulated market forces.
In addition to this privatized system, there is a sizable guaranteed
minimum pension. Unlike the purchased annuities, the minimum
pension is not indexed, but adjusted by the government from time
to time.
2. Cost
We have come to think of privatization as a route to greater
efficiency and lower costs. Thus, perhaps the most surprising
aspect of the Chilean reform is the high cost of running a privatized
social security system, higher than the "inefficient"system that it
replaced. Possibly this high cost should not have been surprising,
for in his 1942 classic, Beveridge referred to a "markedly lower cost
-5-of administration in most forms of State Insurance" ((page 286)
quoted in Atkinson and Hills, 1991, page 5).
Administrativecosts of the new system include both those of
the AFP's that manage mandatory accumulation and those of the
insurance companies that produce disability insurance, life
insurance, and annuities. Valdes-Prieto (1993b) has estimated that
the average administrative charge per effective affiliate while active
are U.S. $89.10 per year (for 1991) which is 2.94% of average
taxable earnings. This is close to 30% of the 10% mandatory
savings rate. The cost per person is not far from costs observed in
other privately-managed pension systems, such as defined-benefit
private pensions in the U.S. However, it compares unfavorably
with administrative costs in well-run unified government managed
systems. For example, the Social Security Administration in the
United States reports a cost of U.S. $18.70 per person per year on
the same basis. However, this includes only a small charge made
to the Social Security Administration by the Internal Revenue
Service for the collection of payroll taxes, and does not follow good
accounting practice for the measurement of capital costs. As a guess
that is probably not too far off, the U.S. system probably costs
twice what it reports.
Since the costs of running a pension system are unlikely to be
either proportional to average wages or independent of average
wages in the economy, it is not obvious exactly how one should
compare costs across countries in the absence of an estimated cost
function. Comparing the United States and Chile, the answer
-6-probably lies somewhere between the 2.5-to-i and 12.5-to-i cost
ratios on these two bases. The issue here is the administrative
efficiency of reliance on the private market, not anything
particularly costly about the Chilean system.
For example, in the U.S., the life insuranceindustry has costs
that run 12-14% of annual benefits.4 Incontrast, the U.S. Social
Security Administration reports administrative costs that are less
than 1 % of annual benefits, so that even doubling thesecosts still
leaves a number well below the private market cost.
For the annuities market, one cancompare the internal rate of
return on Chilean annuities (which are reported to the government)
with comparable duration indexed bonds issuedby a state owned
commercial bank. The average spread over the 18 monthsup to the
end of 1991 was 1.27%. These numberscan be compared with
those in Friedman and Warshawsky (1990), whocompare the rates
on 20-year U.S. government bonds and on corporate bonds directly
placed with insurance companies with the implicit interest rates on
nominal annuities based on using life tables (adjusted forprojected
mortality improvements) for the population purchasing annuities, as
measured by actual company experience. The implicit interest rate
on the mean policy from the ten largest insurance companies was
2.43% lower than the rate ongovernment bonds and 4.35% lower
than the rate on directly placedcorporate debt. Note that the
numbers for the U. S. adjust for improvements in themortality
American Council of Life Insurance, 1992.
-7-table, while the numbers for Chile do not, and that mortality rates
are likely to improve by roughly 1 % per year.
The fact that the annuities market in the U.S. does not operate
like an idealized competitive market can be seen from the spread in
internal rates of return across policies. For the period 1968-1983,
on average, the implicit interest rate was 1.65% higher for the least
expensive of the ten largest companies than for the most expensive.
This gap varied from .75% in 1968 to 3.70% in 1983. The
complete sample best deal, including the 50-odd insurers in Best's
sample, offered an implicit rate that was 1.58% better than the
average of the ten largest. Annuities markets based on individual
choice have generally been viewed as markets that do not work well.
Naturally one wants to know what lies behind this cost
differential between private insurance markets and compulsory
government systems. I believe there are a number of elements.
One is the economies of scale that come with a single compulsory
system without choice. A second is the costs that arise from
competitive attempts to attract more customers -advertising,
salespersonnel and the like. And third is the fact that in actual
markets demand is much less sensitive to price variation than in
idealized competitive markets. This implies that firms will exercise
what market power they do have and, in turn, the presence of
positive markups allows room for X-inefficiency and serves as an
incentive for the greater costs associated with trying to attract more
customers. Generally, firms are eager to have more business, so we
can conclude that generally prices exceed marginal costs.
-8-These elements apply to many products, not just insurance,
although the setting of infrequent purchase of a product that is
difficult for consumers to evaluate, and the presence of adverse
selection probably contribute to higher costs in this market. Also,
the low demand for insurance, which is a basis for having a
mandatory program in the first place, probably contributes to higher
costs as well.
But, one also needs to consider the conditions affecting the
administrative costs of public supply.The collection of
contributions and delivery of cash benefits probably represents the
kind of well-defined task that lends itself to more efficient public
supply than does less well-defined tasks. Moreover, the limited
effort to vary products with consumer preferences (associated with
limited consumer understanding and demand for insurance) also
keeps the task easy for the government.5
These high administrative costs of private markets raise two
questions. One question is the extent to which one wants a system
with many small accounts, since compulsory savings where costs are
eating up a large fraction of savings has an unattractive side (even
if costs are similarly high for voluntary savings). Thus onemay
want to go slow in extending a mandatory savings system to include
many low earners.6 A second question is whether there are
For a discussion of the variety in bureaucratic responses to both
tasks and other dimensions, see Wilson, 1989.
6Forexample, a reform proposal for Poland applied the Chilean
mode! only to high earners; see Topinski and Wisniewski, 1991.
-9-alternative designs that will keep costs lower, either by directly
lowering costs or by increasing competitive pressures, and so
lowering markups.
The Chilean approach of limiting the role of government
(without eliminating it) has left a vacuum where there is a natural
monopoly -thatof collection of monthly payments and record
keeping. Thus one can consider the creation of a clearinghouse to
serve these functions. The AFP's could collectively own the
clearinghouse to prevent monopoly pricing on its part. Also, the
clearinghouse could be restricted not to make a profit, to prevent its
being used as a collusion device to raise industry profits.
The Chilean approach focuses on individual choice. As a
general proposition, group choice is considerably cheaper than
individual choice. For example, in the U.S., measured relative to
assets, mutual funds aimed at individuals are roughly three times as
expensive (on average) as mutual funds handling large accounts (and
so aimed at groups). Thus allowing employers to select a single
AFP for all their workers (perhaps with discounted commissions,
but with a maximum discount size set by government in order to
spread the benefits to others) would be an approach that seems likely
to generate cost savings. Of course, this raises the issue of possibly
corrupt behavior by employers, a behavior that would need
supervision and would no doubt be a problem somewhat.
Nevertheless, the net balance seems likely to be a gain. The
organization of group choice for the annuity market is more difficult
since it lacks employers as a natural organizer, but is another place
-10-where savings could be made. The government could organize
groups for the purpose of insurance purchase.7
3. Capital Market
Before turning to the capital market, let us note that a
compulsory savings system also has effects on the labor market.
Insofar as people would not choose to save, theymay view part of
compulsory savings as a tax on work in the covered sector.
Moreover, the financing and availability of the redistributive
minimum pension also affects incentives. Given the high degree of
movement between covered and uncovered sectors in Chile, these
explicit and implicit taxes have an efficiency effect. However, the
Chilean approach does not raise unfamiliar issues in labor market
inefficiency, so I will not spend time on it. The use of individual
accounts is likely to make workers more aware of the return part of
the system as well as the tax part of the system, and that should
reduce disincentives somewhat. The increase in workers' confidence
that the social security institutions will provide them with significant
pensions in the future also affects the evaluation of the net tax on
work. Labor market efficiency is also affected by how well the law
balances redistribution, insurance, and disincentives.Some
disincentives are a necessary part of redistribution and insurance.
Such a proposal has been made by Diamond, 1992, in the context
of health insurance.
—11—It is worth noting that it is common for benefit-based systems to
have poorly designed labor market incentives.
I turn now to the capital market. The combination of a steady
flow of contributions together with very high real rates of return (an
average of 14.5% from July, 1981 to July, 1992) has meant a large
accumulation of funds invested in the Chilean economy. As of June,
1992, the total accumulations were U.S. $12.44 billion, equal to
35% of 1992 GDP; equity holdings by pension funds were 9.6% of
the value of the Santiago Stock Exchange (with life insurance
companies holding another 1%); and pension funds held 61.1 % of
registered corporate bond issues outstanding (with life insurance
companies holding close to another 30%). On the other hand, at
present, close to 40% of the assets of pension funds are in public
debt. The high rates of return, and implied rapid accumulation, are
the result of generally high rates of return in the Chilean economy,
not particularly astute investment choices by private fund
management. No doubt, these high rates of return have contributed
to the popularity of the reform with Chilean workers.
Together with this accumulation has been an evolution of
regulation of the markets in which these funds are invested,
resulting in a set of capital markets that function far better than they
did before the reform. The Chilean regulators went slowly, with a
gradual expansion in the set of allowable assets as the regulatory
oversight was developed.8 The issue of trying to regulate conflicts
8 Fora discussion of the different elements of oversight, see Merton
£nd Bodie, 1992.
-12-of interest among various players in these markets is a major one.
Both the importance of conflicts of interest and the difficulty of
regulating them should not be overlooked. Obviously, one needs to
have protection against outright embezzlement of funds. Beyond
that, there will be intermediaries that will be simultaneously trading
on many accounts, and there will be intermediaries with voting
shares in some firms and with interests in other firms as well.
Regulation of capital markets is not easy and requires continuous
adjustment to the development of new ways of causing difficulties.
Thus careful regulation of capital markets is both a critical part of
a successful privatization of social security and a significant benefit
of successfully doing such a privatization.
In Chile, privatization of fund management has been combined
with individual choice of fund. This is not a necessary combination.
One could have a system where individual accounts are kept by the
government, with shares earning their return from their proportion
of a single fund that was privately invested; that is, privatization of
fund management can be done without individual choice of fund.
This combination would have lower costs. Insofar as people do not
understand risk-return tradeoffs, the removal of choice of fund may
have little or no welfare significance. However, such a structure
would require a new institution that had the independence that one
wants to see for a central bank, and would also require transparent
transactions between the institution picking the private fund
managers and those managers. This combination may not be
possible in many places, but it may be useful to recognize that many
-13-of the pieces of the Chilean model can be combined with alternative
designs of other pieces.
If individuals held shares in a single, privately managed fund,
it would be straightforward to expand the system to have two or
more funds, with individuals choosing the proportions of their
accounts going into the different funds. Thus younger people might
choose proportions giving higher risk, while older people, closer to
retirement, chose proportions with lower risk. At present, in Chile,
each AFP has a single fund. Thus, while workers can choose AFP,
they are restricted in the range of funds from the incentives for
different AFP's to have similar funds.
In the absence of regulation, the pattern of risk-expected
return points offered would be limited in a setting where each AFP
had a single fund, resembling the choice of commodity
characteristics in a setting where a limited set of firms choose a
single set of product characteristics each. In addition, there is
regulation guaranteeing that no fund will do too much worse than
the average of all funds.9 This creates an incentive for fund
portfolios not to differ too much from the average fund, since the
AFP bears some of the down risk and receives none of theup risk
(except through increased enrollments).
Thus, allowing AFP's to offer a choice of funds in a way that
significantly expanded the range of alternatives available would
require a change in the guarantee structure. There might be a
The guarantee is the lower of half the average return and the
average return less 2%.
-14-guaranteed fund and nonguaranteed funds; there might be separate
guarantees for high and low risk funds, relating to returns on other
high and low risk funds. If the guarantee is viewed as a guarantee
of management ability, rather than rates of return, the guarantee
could be on a weighted average total return on all funds handled by
an AFP, allowing different returns on different individual funds.
The inexperience of many small investors suggests that some form
of guarantee is important, especially in the early stages of such a
reform.
4. Financing the Transition
During the transition, mandatory savings flow into new
individual accounts rather than directly to pay pensions owed by the
existing, mature, old pay-as-you-go social insurance system. This
leaves a large fiscal cost on the government budget. In Chile, there
has been little issue of new (explicit) public debt to finance the
benefits being paid under the old system; although active workers
who switched to the new system have received explicit government
debt, called recognition bonds, on account of past contributions.
This financing decision has implied an increase in fiscal saving, with
the decision to avoid debt financing implying an improvement in the
primary fiscal balance of 3.5- 4%of GDP each year in the 1980's.
It is anticipated that the level of needed fiscal saving will remain
about this level for the 1990's, with a gradual decrease thereafter.
Before the start of the pension reform, the government built a
-15-primary surplus of 5.5%ofGDP with a view to avoiding debt
financing of the reform. Thus, most of the transition deficit -the
deficit in the old pension system -hasbeen financed out of a
primary surplus. In addition, a simultaneous increase in the age of
retirement under the old system significantly decreased the implicit
liabilities of the government.'0
The Chilean privatization could have been done without the
buildup of a surplus to finance the transition. Such a course would
not have the same level of additional capital accumulation as is
associated with a simultaneous improvement in the government fiscal
balance. It is sometimes suggested that privatization is a tool that
will help press a government that has a chronic deficit into doing
something about the deficit. It seems to me that there is serious
political risk associated with such an approach. With a sizable
government deficit, there will be considerable political incentive to
channel the privatized mandatory savings into government debt.
With large government debt holdings by the intermediaries and a
large continuing deficit, there is a strong incentive to pay low
interest rates on this debt in order to lower the deficit. Indeed, in
the Philippines, there have been below-market interest rates paid on
government debt held by pension funds. The combination of
primarily government debt and politically set interest rates defeats
much of the purpose of privatization. Rather than privatization
Minor portions of this deficit were financed by the sale of shares
in formerly state-owned utilities, with pension funds purchasing some of
these shares, and, over the business cycle by the issue of debt.
-16-being a cure for a chronic deficit, it may be the case that a surplus
is an important condition for a successful privatization.
5.Redistributionand Political Risk
Redistribution, both intra and intergenerational, is always a
source of political tension. While economists often push to confine
redistribution to a limited set of policy tools, with efficiency as the
guiding principle for other decisions, the political process recognizes
distributional issues in almost every action it takes. Social security
is no exception. Moreover, intergenerational redistribution is
particularly focused on social security since, other than the overall
level of government debt, it is the most visible setting for this
political struggle. Different institutions seem to lend themselves to
different political outcomes. This is not surprising in light of the
fact that agenda control can often be outcome control and the further
fact that many in the voting public have limited understanding of the
issues involved. Democratic procedures can lead to inconsistencies.
Moreover, it is often hard to judge whether more redistribution to
the current elderly is better or worse.
Some economists approach intergenerational redistribution
from the perspective of capital accumulation, arguing against much
redistribution to the current elderly since it results in less capital
accumulation. But it needs to be recognized that the capital stock
is not itself a variable of primary (as opposed to derived) interest.
Rather, the correct capital stock is the efficient one for the pattern
-17-of consumption that society wants. If it is desired to redistribute
more to people who consume more earlier, than it is appropriate to
have a smaller capital stock. There are several complications here.
One arises if there are externalities associated with capital
accumulation, as is assumed in some of the new growth theory. If
so, this is relevant for the optimal redistribution pattern or,
equivalently, concern for the capital stock is part of the primary
concerns. Second, we have to recognize that politics may have
resulted in inappropriate aggregate savings, and social security may
represent a place where the politics can be worked out differently.
Conversely, the ability of the government to affect capital
accumulation by other tools, such as the government budget
surplus/deficit implies that there is not necessarily an issue in capital
accumulation.
I find it hard to make a general normative judgment about the
fact that benefit-based systems seem to lend themselves more to
redistribution to the current elderly than do contribution-based
systems. One does need to be concerned about the extent to which
the well-off elderly receive a disproportionate share of
redistribution. A country with multiple systems, rather than a single
unified system, is particularly prone to this problem.This
difference in outcomes in response to different bases of design is
interesting since there is little in one system that (on average)
couldn't be accomplished by the other. Yet adding amounts to
individual accounts seems politically a much more difficult action to
-18-take than choosing a benefit formula that results in much higher
returns on taxes for some workers.
Similarly, intragenerational redistribution appears to be easier
to accomplish with a benefit-based approach than with a
contribution-based approach, although, again, one could do
redistribution on an annual basis for the amounts going into
accounts.11 Such redistribution is not part of the Chilean system.
It is interesting to note that political suggestions that something
would be done to improve the pension benefits for Chilean coal
miners have foundered on the politics of how to finance them, in a
way that would probably not have happened with a benefit-based
system. Individual accounts seem to call for identifying the source
of funds to be added to individual accounts. This is different from
redistribution to the current elderly from a benefit structure that
leaves the cost vaguely on the future. Such legislation can easily
lead to a program that is not viable in the long run, which is clearly
unsatisfactory. Thus there is real appeal in individual accounts as
insulation of the pension system from political actions to increase
benefits without direct financing. The Chilean system gets high
marks on this dimension, although it is not clear how much of the
Chilean reforms, beyond individual accounts, is needed to hold
down this sort of political action.
While some argue for the superiority of a political institution
that is more transparent in its depiction of redistribution, it is not
'Forexample, Boskin, Kotlikoff and Shoven (1988) have proposed
a system with individual accounts and annual redistributions.
-19-clear that this is superior to an institution that is more transparent in
its depiction of outcomes. There is a deep tension between political
views that concentrate on outcomes and political views that
concentrate on changes in outcomes. At its extreme, the tension is
reflected in the alternative slogans that "all property is theft" and
"all taxation is theft." Benefit-based formulas make consumption
patterns clearer than do contribution based systems. Contribution
based systems make redistributions clearer. The sensitivity of
political outcomes to the relative visibility of different aspects of the
system may reflect the limited understanding of voters of a complex
issue.Moreover, the different basic designs involve different
structures carried over into the future, which then form the basis for
future legislative actions.
There are further issues coming from the choice of basic
design. For example, in Chile, the minimum pension financed out
of general revenues is not indexed for inflation, while purchased
annuities in the mandatory savings system must be indexed. At a
quick glance, this combination does not seem to have a good
normative basis and appears to be an example of the aphorism that
"a program for poor people is a poor program." Consider a
political process that adjusts pensions for inflation from time to
time, rather than having automatic indexing. This might affect the
trend line of pension benefits. On the other hand, if, on average,
the trend in pensions is the same, the question becomes one of
whether the pension recipients are good people to bear the risks of
a political process that results in fluctuations in real benefits. Many
-20-retirees will have difficulty doing the kind of intertemporal
substitution needed to bear this risk well. A system designed to be
automatic, and not subject to the choice of party in power, would
seem superior.
In addition to this purely political risk, there is the issue of
fluctuations in the balance in the government budget. Government
expenditures on various activities tend to move together with the
state of fiscal balance. At first blush it seems appropriate to have
government payments for pensions fluctuate along with other
government expenditures.However, there is an alternative
viewpoint that asks whether there is any reason to have pensions that
flow through the government budget fluctuate more than pensions
that do not flow through the government budget (and are subject
only to tax changes). It seems to me that there is no more reason
for fluctuations of one sort of pension than of the other. Therefore,
the political insulation inherent in the Chileansystem seems to me
very attractive. It is interesting to note that Chile did freeze the
COLA for pensions received under the continuation of the old
system in 1985. Since COLA's paid by private insurance companies
do not directly affect the government budget, one would notexpect
to see the government freeze pensions paid under the new system at
the time of some future budgetsqueeze. That is, the lumping
together of many sources of income subject to taxation or implicit
taxation, so that they are treated similarly, may lead to lower tax
fluctuations on a broader base, which should result ingreater
efficiency.
-21-6. Social risk and aggregate change
Examining the actuarial forecasts of social security systems,
it is clear that they are subject to large aggregate risks. These
include the rate of growth of real wages, the real rate of return,
mortality factors, and, in PAYG systems, the growth of the labor
force. In addition to considerable uncertainties about these factors,
some economies, including Chile, are projecting significant aging of
their populations.
Different pension systems have different degrees of need for
adaptation to changes in basic economic and demographic
parameters. The Chilean system is sensitive to interest rate and
mortality changes since these affect the adequacy of retirement
income relative to prior earnings. Pay-as-you-go systems have more
concern with population factors. Commonly, social security systems
are subject to political gridlock as they attempt to adapt to
significantly changed circumstances. The Chilean system can be on
automatic pilot in the sense that there is no necessity of correction
and the magnitude of cost from nonoptimal parameters is probably
not too large.This is in contrast with systems that become
nonviable if circumstances change and the system is not adapted.
While PAYG systems can be put on automatic pilot (with taxes or
benefits or a combination adjusting automatically), in practice they
are not. This affects worker expectations as well as affecting
outcomes when the future becomes the present.
-22-7. Insurance
One could have a compulsory savings system that handed over
the entire accumulated fund in a lump sum on reaching retirement
age. However, the same lack of foresight that lies behind the
institution of a mandatory savings program suggests that people
would consume too rapidly out of such a lump sum. Moreover, if
the minimum pension continued in its current form, people would
have a powerful incentive to consume rapidly in order to tap into the
minimum pension. Thus the Chilean system has a maximum
allowable rate of withdrawal from accumulated funds not used to
purchase an indexed annuity. The rate varies with age and recent
interest earnings on the funds. Eligibility to tap retirement funds in
either form is unrelated to whether individuals stop working. Only
sufficient age (or for early withdrawal, sufficient accumulation) are
necessary to begin withdrawals.
A system such as this is missing many elements of insurance
that could have been built into the system. I want to briefly contrast
a system of accumulation followed by annuity purchase with a
traditional system that is built around a benefit formula. To keep
the comparison close, we can consider a benefit-based system where
the benefit varies with accumulated taxes paid. Thus the central
contrast between the systems is whether or not the same conversion
factor is used for everyone in converting accumulated funds into an
annuity. That is, a benefit-based system can pay benefits to workers
that are proportional to the accumulated taxes paid, with
-23-accumulation calculated using an interest rate. A private market
will use different conversion factors for different people, reflecting
estimates of different life expectancies for different people, and
reflecting different markups by different firms. In practice, the
formulas in benefit-based systems tend to accumulate wages, not
taxes, with different accumulation factors, including ignoring (zero
weight) some years, often, unfortunately, many years. A system
that accumulated wages using an average wage index as the indexing
factor probably does not differ very much from one that is using an
interest rate.
In the Chilean system, funds are accumulated until retirement
age is reached. Thus an individual with no interest in an estate has
no way of converting funds if he should die before retirement into
higher consumption if he survives. A traditional benefit-based
system does this automatically. Second, an individual contemplating
a future purchase of an annuity has no way to insure the rate at
which the annuity will be quoted to him. Thus, arriving at
retirement age with a long expected life (in the eyes of insurance
companies) results in a lower consumption per year than arriving at
retirement age with a short expected life (in their eyes). Again, a
benefit-based system provides this insurance automatically.
The two types of systems also distribute differently across
groups with different life expectancy, such as men and women.
Women, with longer life expectancy, would have lower consumption
levels (and presumably higher marginal utilities of consumption) for
the same earnings levels in an accumulation based system.
-24-These results follow from the use of different life tables for
different individuals by the private market. Conversely, insurance
companies do not measure life expectancy fuily accurately. This
leads to selection problems. One of the problems is that the
insurance companies compete to attract the groups who will be
profitable.This probably adds to the costs of competition.
Secondly, individuals who do not like the rates quoted to them have
the alternative of a phased withdrawal. Removal of this option
would remove this dimension of selection. However it would cut
against the sense that people have of controlling these funds.
Moreover, reducing the set of alternatives would probably decrease
the price sensitivity of demand, resulting in higher markups by
insurance companies. Thus the lack of annuity purchase can be
viewed as an insurance failing of the system.
Individuals do have a choice between a larger estate and more
lifetime consumption. For this choice, accurately priced annuities
(as opposed to uniformly priced annuities) are an appropriate part of
the incentive structure. With a benefit-based system, individuals can
increase their estates by the purchase of life insurance from the
private market.
Another dimension of risk that the Chileans system did not
attempt to address is risk about length of working life. A benefit
based-system that pays benefits only after actual retirement and that
adjusts benefits less than actuarially redistributes from those with
long working lives to those with short working lives. Such a system
has both insurance and redistributional elements.
-25-8. Concluding Remarks
Governments seem prone to a variety of actions that undercut
the optimal provision of retirement income. Redistribution often
goes to the well off, not the poor. Redistribution to the poor is
often less than some would want, and designed in a way so that it
tends to erode over time. Programs are sometimes designed so they
are unlikely to be sustainable. Incentives associated with programs
are often ill designed. Variation with the state of the government
budget is often excessive. The array of potential different social
security institutions is large. Different alternative basic approaches
lend themselves to different ways of solving the design problems and
of resisting the different susceptibilities to poor government actions.
Chile has given us a fascinating example to observe. Countries can
do worse than imitating Chile (and many have). I have argued that
countries choosing to privatize can do better by recognizing that the
private market is an expensive institution and so trying to hold down
the cost of using the private market. Group choice rather than
individual choice often represents a good tradeoff of lower costs
against fewer options.
I think it is also important to recognize that it is not easy to
imitate Chile -itrequires hard work at regulation and political
discipline so that such a reform doesn't unravel in either private or
public raiding of accumulated funds. The insulation from political
risk and the development of capital markets, which are the major
benefits of the Chilean approach, do not come automatically -they
-26-require skill and discipline. Thus whether to go the Chilean route
and how closely to imitate theChileandetails are questions best
answered separately on a country-by-country basis.
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